Attorney General Edwin Meese III explained why the Supreme Court's Miranda decision (holding that subjects have a right to remain silent and have a lawyer present during questioning) is unnecessary: "You don't have many suspects who are innocent of a crime. That's contradictory. If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect." | |
U.S. News and World Report, 10/14/85 |
The tricks shown in Doing it in C raise a question. Can a look at the disassembly find pieces of code that distinguish viruses in general from regular code? You can call that the holy grail of scanning. This is very different from finding specific pieces of code that identify exactly one virus (a signature). Which is again very different from identifying a virus exactly …
The first problem is how to get at "the code". Everything from the start of the file to the last byte of code is mapped into the code segment. This is described in How it works and illustrated in Bashful glance. A virus could hide in a region declared as ELF header. VIT and its variations, including One step closer to the edge, put the code into section .rodata.
So keep in mind that this chapter is very hypothetical.
Let's have fun by looking at the sections of an executable file. Here comes a script that extracts a single section as raw data. readelf(1) provides a related (but useless) option.
-x <number>
--hex-dump=<number>
Displays the contents of the indicated section as a hexadecimal dump.
Source: src/suspicious_code/dumpsection.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -sw
use strict;
$::file = '/bin/sh' if (!defined($::file));
$::section = '.text' if (!defined($::section));
open(READELF, '-|', "readelf -S $::file") || die "readelf: $! ";
while(<READELF>)
{
if (m/^ \[[ 0-9]+\] $::section /)
{
my @word = split;
my $off = hex($word[4]);
my $size = hex($word[5]);
open(FILE, '<', $::file) || die "open: $!";
sysseek(FILE, $off, 0) || die "seek: $!";
my $dump;
sysread(FILE, $dump, $size) || die "read: $!";
close FILE;
syswrite STDOUT, $dump;
}
}
close READELF; |
And the first test is simple. Compare the following output with gdb(1)'s dump in The entry point.
Command: src/suspicious_code/ndisasm.sh
#!/bin/sh
src/suspicious_code/dumpsection.pl -file=/bin/bash -section=.text \
| ndisasm -u - \
| sed -e '/hlt/q' |
Output: out/redhat-linux-i386/suspicious_code/ndisasm
00000000 31ED xor ebp,ebp
00000002 5E pop esi
00000003 89E1 mov ecx,esp
00000005 83E4F0 and esp,byte -0x10
00000008 50 push eax
00000009 54 push esp
0000000A 52 push edx
0000000B 6830D00A08 push dword 0x80ad030
00000010 68608A0508 push dword 0x8058a60
00000015 51 push ecx
00000016 56 push esi
00000017 6880940508 push dword 0x8059480
0000001C E827FCFFFF call 0xfffffc48
00000021 F4 hlt |